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MIRANDA DECISION REVISITED: DID 
IT GIVE CRIMINALS TOO MANY 
RIGHTS?* 
Stephen J. Markman"* & Paul Marcus*** 
I. COMMENTS OF STEPHEN J. MARKMAN 
In 1963 a teenage girl was kidnapped and raped on her way home from 
work. The police later apprehended the rapist. Following a brief interview and 
an identification lineup; he gave a full confession to the police. The confession 
was later used in securing his conviction. Three years later, in 1966, the Supreme 
Court overturned Ernest Miranda's conviction.' The Court found no ground for 
concluding that Miranda's confession was not freely given or for doubting that 
he committed the offense. However, the Court did find error in the failure of 
the police to comply with a set of restrictions on questioning that had simply 
not existed prior to the Miranda C:lecision. In a unique five to four decision, a 
decision that I believe could not have been replicated before 1966 or after 1966, 
the Court departed from recognized constitutional standards and prescribed a 
new set of non-constitutional procedures for police questioning of suspects in 
custody. 
The Miranda decision has continued to define the ground rules for custodial 
questioning up to the present time. The prescription of these extra-constitutional 
standards has resulted in a two-fold tragedy. It has been tragic in its effect on 
the innocent victims of crime by impairing the government's ability to bring 
criminals to justice. It has also been tragic in its effect on the protection of the 
rights of persons suspected of crime. The Miranda rules are an inept and 
ineffective means of ensuring fair treatment of suspects in custodial questioning. 
Their nationwide imposition by judicial fiat has had the practical effect of stifling 
any efforts to develop more effective means of doing so. 
• These are the opening remarks made by the respective authors at a debate at the University 
of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Kansas City, Missouri, on April 21, 1988. The debate was 
presented as a part of the Joseph Cohen Lecture Series. The University of Missouri-Kansas City Law 
Review has provided editorial notes. 
•• Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy, United States Department of Justice. B.A., 
Duke University, 1971; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1974. 
••• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona, College of Law; A.B., University of 
California at Los Angeles, 1968; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1971. 
I. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Before turning to the evidence on these points, I should briefly explain what 
I believe are three basic misconceptions about Miranda. It is particularly important 
to have a clear understanding of the radical character of the Miranda restrictions 
because recent reporting frequently has misrepresented this issue. The first mis-
conception is that the Miranda rules are required by the Constitution. This 
misconception is directly refuted both by the Constitution and by the Miranda 
decision. The Constitution does not prescribe interrogation procedures. 2 It only 
states that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other 
words, it simply prohibits the actual coercion of suspects or defendants to obtain 
incriminating statements. The Miranda decision emphasized that the procedures 
it delineated are only one possible approach to guarding against unconstitutional 
coercion in police questioning, and explicitly encouraged the federal government 
and the states to continue to search for better, more effective procedures. 3 
Numerous more recent decisions of the Supreme Court also have explicitly 
affirmed that the Miranda rules are not constitutional requirements but only a 
particular set of safeguards whose purpose is to reduce the likelihood of coercion.4 
The second common misconception is that the Miranda rules, even if not 
constitutionally required, at least serve the important purpose of informing a 
suspect of his constitutional rights. However, this also is incorrect. The rights to 
which the Miranda warnings relate are primarily non-constitutional restrictions 
that were created by the Miranda decision itself. For example, the right to counsel 
in custodial interrogation, mentioned in the third and fourth Miranda warnings, 
simply did not exist prior to Miranda, and is .now clearly regarded by the Supreme 
Court as a non-constitutional "prophylactic" right. s Even the first Miranda 
warning telling a suspect that he has a· right to remain silent, is at best, a highly 
imprecise and misleading way of referring to the Constitution's prohibition of 
compelling a person to incriminate himself. 6 The Constitution prohibits the 
government from engaging in coercion, but it does not create a right to remain 
silent in any broader sense. These are different matters. In particular, there is 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless· on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
4. See Connecticut v. Barrett, __ U.S. __ , 107 S.Ct. 828, 832 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 
(1974). 
5. See Barrett, __ U.S. __ , 107 S.Ct. at 832; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); 
Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Prospective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 193, 203-04, 239-
41 (1987). 
6. See supra note 2. 
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no constitutional rule that a person cannot even be asked questions unless he 
consents to be questioned. As will be discussed shortly, a rule against asking 
questions without the suspect's consent is one of the central features of the 
Miranda system and perhaps its most damaging characteristic. 
After delivery of the Miranda warnings, one might suppose that a police 
officer could then at least ask a suspect questions. At that point, questioning is 
still not allowed. This position leads to the third basic misconception about 
Miranda: the belief that it is simply a matter of reciting some warnings to a 
suspect before asking questions. In fact, even after the Miranda warnings have 
been given, a suspect cannot be asked questions unless he affirmatively consents 
to be questioned. In legalese, this requirement is referred to as the requirement 
of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The radical character pf this restriction 
cannot be overstated. It is the essence of what is wrong with Miranda. Suppose, 
for example, that a person was taken into custody on suspicion of committing a 
murder and was given the Miranda warnings by the officer conducting the 
interview. Suppose further that the officer then said to the suspect, in a wholly 
inoffensive and non-pressuring way, that he would like to get the suspect's side 
of the story. If the suspect then freely gave a full confession to the murder, it 
could not be used at trial, but would have to be concealed from the jury. In the 
absence of an affirmative waiver, a suspect cannot be questioned at all, no matter 
how brief, how restrained, and how proper the questioning may be. The practical 
effect of these innovations is that a significant proportion of criminal suspects 
simply cannot be questioned at all, because they do not give a waiver or express 
an interest in talking to a lawyer. This group includes a great many suspects who 
might be quite willing to talk if they could be asked questions, but who do not 
submit to questioning when questioning is conditioned on their affirmatively 
expressing a desire to waive the rights set out in Miranda warnings. 
· A number of empirical studies carried out in the immediate aftermath of 
Miranda indicate that the resulting harm to the effectiveness of police investigation 
has been extreme. For example, one study in Pittsburgh examined interrogations 
by police detectives in several major crime categories.' Prior to Miranda, detectives 
in Pittsburgh had advised suspects that they had a right not to talk and a right 
to counsel. Despite this partial use of Miranda-like procedures before the Miranda 
decision, the implementation of the full range of Miranda restrictions resulted in 
a major impairment of the police's ability to obtain evidence from suspects. 
After Miranda, over forty percent of suspects could not be questioned at all, in 
contrast to the pre-Miranda situation in which every suspect at least could be 
questioned. Miranda also resulted in a major reduction in admissions of guilt. 
For example, it cut in half the number of confessions in the homicide and 
robbery categories. Before Miranda, about sixty percent of suspected killers and 
7. Seeburger and Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. 
REv. I (1967). The study was based on files of the Detective Branch of the Pittsburgh Police Bureau, 
which conducted investigations of homicides and serious felonies. 
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robbers confessed; after Miranda, only about thirty percent did so. Studies in a 
number of other cities have produced consistent findings concerning the effects 
of Miranda. 8 For example, District Attorney (now Senator) Arlen Specter of 
Pennsylvania reported that an estimated ninety percent of suspects in Philadelphi.a 
made statements to the police prior to Miranda. After Miranda, the corresponding 
figure was only about forty percent. 
These empirical findings only confirm what common sense would suggest 
concerning the effect of rules like Miranda. Whether guilty or innocent, a person 
who has been arrested for a crime is the one person in the world who knows 
the most about the truth or falsity of the charges against him. Rules that often 
bar the police from seeking the truth from that uniquely knowledgeable individual 
will necessarily impose a heavy toll on the search for the truth. As Justice Byron 
White observed in his dissent in Miranda, 
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist 
or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to 
repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence there will not be a 
gain, but a loss, in human dignity.• 
Justice White's words have proven to be prophetic. In light of subsequent 
experience, we now are in a better position to assess the magnitude of this loss 
and can see that it has been very great indeed. Innocent citizens have been 
victimized by criminals who would have been brought to justice but for the 
impediments to the pursuit of truth created by the Miranda decision. The same 
point may be seen in another way by considering what would happen if rules 
were adopted that barred the police from attempting to obtain fingerprint 
evidence, eyewitness testimony, or any other type of important evidence in half 
of the cases in which they currently are free to seek it. No one would question 
that such rules would impair the effectiveness of police investigation and damage 
the government's ability to protect the public from crime. The Miranda rules 
operate in precisely this way, limiting the law enforcement authorities' ability to 
obtain one of the most important types of evidence in criminal cases, the 
confession. 
The objection is made that even if the Miranda rules do occasionally free 
criminals and endanger the public, this cost is justified by the risk that questioning 
will be carried out in an abusive or coercive manner if not stringently restricted. 
However, any legitimate concern over the possibility of abuse cuts in the opposite 
direction. The Miranda rules do not further the protection of suspects in any 
sensible or appropriate way, and they have discouraged the adoption of more 
effective means to that end. As Justice Harlan observed in his Miranda dissent, 
an officer who is willing to abuse a suspect to get a confession and lie about it 
8. See Markman, supra note ~. at 224-22~. 
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, ~42 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
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in court obviously would be just as willing to lie about giving Miranda warnings 
and getting a waiver .10 
Moreover, even assuming general compliance by the police, the Miranda 
rules are not a rationally conceived set of safeguards. Their practical effect is to 
divide suspects into two classes: those who stand on their Miranda rights, and 
those who waive these rights and submit to questioning. The effect of Miranda 
on suspects who do not give a waiver is not to protect them from abusive 
questioning, but to insulate them from any sort of questioning, no matter how 
brief and restrained. On the other hand, in cases in which suspects do give a 
waiver, interrogations can be carried out much as they were before Miranda. 
They remain secret proceedings in which the avoidance of overbearing or heavy-
handed practices depends on the self-restraint and honesty of the officers conducting 
the interview. If questions arise later concerning the occurrence of illegalities or 
improprieties, they are resolved on the basis of swearing matches between the 
officers and the suspect.· · · .. 
If one is seriously interested in assuring fair treatment of suspects, far better 
means than the Miranda rules are at hand. In particular, videotaping or recording 
of interrogations would provide suspects with the type of objective protection 
that is simply lacking under Miranda rules. Concerns about protracted grilling 
of suspects or other overly aggressive practices also could be addressed sensibly 
in other ways. For example, imposing reasonable time limits on questioning or 
adopting specific rules concerning permissible behavior in questioning suspects 
would go beyond the Miranda rules in assuring appropriate treatment of suspects, 
but also would not carry Miranda's heavy costs to the effectiveness of police 
investigation. In sum, Miranda is bad law under the Constitution, bad law for 
protecting the public from crime, and bad law for protecting the rights of 
suspects. 
The challenge facing us today is to develop superior procedures and standards 
to replace the Miranda rules. Congress's enactment of a statute in 1968 that 
rejected Miranda's restrictions on the use of voluntary confessions, 11 and the 
Supreme Court's clear view that these rules are in no sense constitutional 
requirements, create an environment in which this challenge can be met. Moving 
beyond the Miranda decision holds the promise of fundamental benefits in 
promoting the protection of constitutional rights as well as fundamental benefits 
in promoting the effective prosecution of crime. It is long past time that our 
society, burdened by levels of violent crime unparalleled in the western democracies 
and unparalleled in the history of our country, addressed the excesses of the 
Warren court criminal justice jurisprudence. Even one innocent person's 
terrorization or loss of life or limb would be too high a price to pay for Miranda's 
10. /d. at SOS, 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
11. Crime Control Act of 1968, tit. II, 18 U.S.C. § 3.501 (198.5); the act reportedly "repealed" 
Miranda and the McNabb-Mallory Rule in federal prosecutions; see, e.g., Markman, supra note S at 
226-29. 
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perverse procedures, ·and we will never know fully the enormity of the actual 
toll. There is nothing Miranda preserves in the balance, certainly not any legitimate 
right of the criminal suspect that offsets this continuing tragedy for civilized 
society. 
D. COMMENTS OF PAUL MARCUS 
It is a pleasure to be here today to revisit the Supreme Court's monumental 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 12 I think Miranda was good law and good policy 
twenty-two years ago; I feel even more strongly about it today. If anything, 
history has fully proved the five Justice majority correct; Miranda was needed 
then and has worked extremely effectively in the period since. The debate over 
Miranda, while not wholly irrelevant to our criminal justice system, nevertheless 
is somewhat problematic. Were it not for a few vociferous law professors and a 
few even more outspoken and visible members of the Justice Department's staff, 
frankly, there would not be much debate about Miranda. 
Police chiefs do not complain about it; former critics who are on the Court 
do not complain about it; even many of those who strongly disagreed with the 
decision twenty years ago do not complain about it today. To a certain extent, 
the debate has passed by Miranda, except for the focus given by Attorney General 
Edwin Meese. Much of the debate today is, and should be, on issues such as 
identifying the sources of crime; dealing with questions of apprehending criminals 
and detecting crime; coming up with alternatives for incarceration; dealing with 
the cost, both societal an~ financial, of our tremendous drug problem; and trying 
to keep a lid on a spiraling prison population. Those are the key and vital 
questions that ought to be debated. Indeed if we really are concerned about 
victims of crime, one might ask the question for instance, why is it that out of 
every one hundred serious crimes, murder, rape, robbery, and assault, only forty-
eight of them are reported to police. Only twenty-one out of one hundred result 
in arrest. Only eleven out of one hundred result in cases filed for prosecution. 
Only eight out of one hundred result in convictions. Only two out of one hundred 
result in incarcerations. These issues are the kind that ought to be discussed. 
Still, to a very real extent, the Attorney General of the United States focuses 
the debate in the criminal justice system by the sheer power and prestige of his 
office. For the last two years that focus has been on overruling Miranda, and 
many, including my colleague Mr. Markman, have been a critical part of that 
focus.· If we were to strengthen significantly Miranda today, or ·significantly 
undercut it or even overrule it .• such action woul~ have little impact on the larger 
questions asked. To a large degree, the debate over Miranda, as has been noted 
by both critics and proponents, is a debate over a symbol, an important symbol, 
but a symbol nevertheless~ It stands for all that we cherish in our system of 
criminal justice and our system of constitutional rights. It is a symbol indicating 
12. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
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that we understand these rights, that everyone has these rights and that these 
rights will be enforced. 
Perhaps the strongest criticism leveled at the Miranda case over the last 
twenty years was the first criticism by Justice Harlan in his dissent.U He wrote 
the great concurring decision in Katz, 14 the wiretapping case; he strongly enforced 
the probable cause requirements in Spinelli, 15 which involved unnamed informants; 
and he wrote the tremendous majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 16 where 
a young man wore a jacket with a nasty obscenity on it. Still Justice Harlan was 
fundamentally wrong in his criticism of Miranda. He strongly disagreed with 
both the notion of adjudication in Miranda and the content of it. The "notion 
of adjudication" referred to the Supreme Court's enacting a new "code of 
criminal procedure," rather than deciding a case under the case or controversy 
requirement. Justice Harlan disagreed with the substance of that codeY 
If it was a code of criminal procedure, it was a mighty short code because 
in spite of all the hand wringing and hair pulling over the last twenty years as 
to the technicalities of Miranda and the complications of Miranda, the decision 
itself is really quite simple. All the Court held was, using common sense definitions 
of custody and interrogation, if suspects are in custody by having their freedom 
of movement significantly limited and if they are being interrogated by police 
officers, the statements of the suspects cannot be used ai trial to prove their 
guilt unless the defendants received four warnings. Now this really cannot be all 
that complicated if every school kid in the country knows them. Surely if you 
have watched ·any movie starring Clint Eastwood, Sylvester Stallone, or Eddie 
Murphy you know the warnings, and they fit on these little three by five cards 
that all police officers seem to carry. You must be. warned that you have a right 
to remain silent, anything you say will be used against you, you have a right to 
an attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney the state will provide you with 
one. That is really all there is to it; not very complicated, not very complex, 
certainly not very technical. That is why the huge outcry at the time of the 
Miranda decision surprised me; what does not surprise me is the lack of focused 
criticism now by the law enforcement community, by and large. The reality is 
that those warnings are easy to give and most people understand them. Still, it 
is important to give the warnings both for those who do not understand them 
and for those who are in a very emotional state. In essense, this demonstrates 
to the suspect that not only does the police officer understand what his rights 
are but that the officer is fully prepared to honor those rights. 
To a certain extent, the criticism over Miranda is itself somewhat technical. 
There would be few people who would argue that knowing about your rights or 
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
IS. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
16. 403 U.S. IS (1971). 
17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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being told about your rights is a bad thing. Instead, the argument is that telling 
people their rights and enforcing those rights somehow interferes with effective 
interrogation and in any case is contrary to the history and language of the fifth 
amendment.' 8 The response is twofold. First, if giving warnings really does 
interfere with effective interrogation, it seems we should be interfering with 
effective interrogation. It is inconceivable to me that people seriously argue that 
we, as a society, are worse off if individuals are advised of their rights and 
advised of the right to have an attorney with them when confronted, while in 
custody, by law enforcement officers. It would appear that such warnings make 
sense, are a good idea, and as a matter of policy ought to be pursued. 
As to the argument concerning the history and language of the fifth amend-
ment, one must defer to the critics for they are probably right; if you look to 
the language of the fifth amendment, which simply talks about no person being 
compelled to be a witness against himself, that certainly does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that a suspect in custody, who is about to be interrogated, has 
to receive four particular warnings. Moreover, it is also very clear that the 
draftsmen of the fifth amendment, two hundred years ago, probably did not 
contemplate a warning situation involving an interrogation such as was found in 
Miranda. 
However, this argument hardly ends the debate. The question as to the 
precise language of the fifth amendment is not terribly helpful. The meaning of 
the fifth amendment changes; the meaning of the Constitution changes and 
should change. The Constitution is a living and vital instrument of effective 
government and we are not locked into determining what was compulsion or 
probable cause two hundred years ago versus today. 
It is often stated that this position runs contrary to original intent. This 
argument is somewhat beside the point, thus making it difficult to understand 
the great love affair that critics of Miranda, as well as other cases, have with 
the notion of original intent. Apparently the idea is that by discerning the original 
intent, we then are locked into an interpretation given two hundred years ago. 
That approaches the nonsensical. Times change, conditions change, and certainly 
our country has changed dramatically. Original intent serves as a beacon, a 
source of inspiration as to what we ought to do under the Constitution, and 
perhaps as a guideline on limits of where this nation should move in the future. 
To take much more from original intent, however, leads one down a very 
dangerous path. 
It may be asked, "How does one discern original intent?" Was it the intent 
of the person who drafted the amendment to the Constitution, the people who 
voted on it, the people who were in Congress at the time, or the general sense 
of the population at that time? It may prove virtually impossible to discern such 
intent. Moreover, even if one could, it could well be that our population today 
would take a very different view of the matter. Certainly the best example of 
18. See supra note 2. 
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this is Gideon v. Wainwright.l 9 Unquestionably the draftsmen of the sixth 
amendment20 did not intend that the sixth amendment require counsel be provided 
at state expense to indigents in felony cases. What was meant, as near as can be 
determined today, is that if someone charged with a crime had an attorney, that 
attorney ought not to be barred from participating in a criminal prosecution on 
behalf of the individual. Yet when Gideon was decided in the early sixties, there 
was no tremendous outcry. It was a decision whose time had come. Original 
intent or not, in our civilized society, views change so that we needed the result 
in Gideon. 
We are left with a question which has faltered in numbers but remains quite 
intense and has troubled many for the last twenty years. Why is there this 
opposition to Miranda? The history and language of the fifth amendment, which 
forms the basis of this criticism, are somewhat beside the point. The criticism 
from opponents is simply that we did.som.ething fundamentally wrong in Miranda. 
We ought not to be warning individuals Of their right to remain silent and right 
to have counsel present during interrogation because that will disrupt effective 
interrogation. If that truly is the criticism, it can be met head-on. As a matter 
of policy we ought to be proud of advising individuals of their rights. Looking 
at the history of interrogation in the last twenty years, it is an area where much 
good has been done, and Miranda has had little negative impact. As Justice 
Frankfurter observed about twenty-five years ago, not the least significant test 
of the quality ofa civilization is its treatment of those charged with crime. 
III. REB UTI AL OF MARKMAN 
It is not true that the law enforcement community has learned to live with 
Miranda. In fact, the major law enforcement organizations and police organi-
zations have supported Attorney General Meese's position on this issue. As 
somebody said shortly after the Miranda decision, if the Court in Miranda had 
said that before questioning a suspect an officer must whistle Yankee Doodle, 
the police would have whistled Yankee Doodle and would have learned to live 
with it. The relevant point is not that the police have learned to comply with 
Miranda. The relevant point is that it has caused a great deal of damage to 
society. Our solicitude here is not for the police, although they strongly support 
the Attorney General's position; it is for society and the cost to society has been 
quite substantial. 
19. 372 U.S. 33S (1963). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
of Counsel for his defense. 
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The fact that giving Miranda warnings is simple is irrelevant to Miranda's 
cost in the custodial process. Miranda has resulted in the transformation of the 
fifth amendment from a constitutional provision that prohibits coercion of 
suspects into one that effectively prohibits any questioning of many suspects. 
This transformation has been carried out without any basis in the text of the 
amendment. It is the confessions that are never obtained and would have been 
obtained before Miranda that are the cost of this system. 
The suggestion that little would change if Miranda were repealed is remark-
able. One has only to look to the fact that in Philadelphia ninety percent of 
suspects gave statements to the police prior to Miranda, while after Miranda only 
about forty percent of such sessions produced the same results. 11 It is untenable 
to suggest that this impact is insignficant and that the overruling of Miranda 
would have rio impact upon our criminal justice system. The unsolved homicide 
rate in this country has more than quadrupled since 1966. Miranda is not the 
only factor, but for anyone to suggest that Miranda is irrelevant is simply 
unrealistic. 
Miranda is not just the forewarnings. A suspect can be told that he has the 
right to remain silent, that what is said can be used against him, that there is a 
right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be provided if necessary. Yet, if 
following such warnings a suspect is asked about a body found in his residence, 
and the suspect confesses to the murder, this information will be thrown out of 
court. It is not enough to warn; it is not enough to explain rights. It is also 
necessary to obtain an affirmative statement by the individual that he is prepared 
to speak with the police and that he does not want to consult an attorney. In 
too many instances this will never occur. An environment is created which 
discourages confessions and discourages individuals from cooperating with police. 
When the negative consequences of being candid with the police and the alter-
natives to doing so are exclusively emphasized to the suspect, it is not surprising 
that many decline to give an affirmative waiver and refuse to submit to ques-
tioning. It is not a ·matter of just giving four warnings; there is also a matter of 
the requirement of an ·intelligent, knowing waiver. 
It is said that the language of the fifth amendment does not end the debate. 
However, for many of us the language of the amendment does end the debate. 
It is the Constitution of the United States which is supposedly the basis of 
Miranda. Yet neither the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the fifth amendment 
nor the Constitution provide any basis for Miranda. This alone should end the 
debate. Even if Miranda was good policy, it is a policy that should be imposed 
by legislative authorities, not by courts acting by fiat without any kind of textual 
basis in the Constitution. The language of the Constitution does change from 
time to time and there is little dispute that it should. Change is allowed 
21. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Low Enforcement: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Lows and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 200-19 (1967). 
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constitutionally through article five22 which provides for constitutional amend-
ments. For anyone else to unilaterally change the Constitution is inconsistent 
with the Constitution. Our system works properly only if it respects procedures 
for change that are incorporated in article five. 
Videotaping of custodial interrogations would provide a superior alternative 
to Miranda. Such a procedure would ensure that individuals are not coerced, are 
not abused, and are not subject to inappropriate treatment in the questioning 
process. Yet at the same time, it would allow police to ask questions in a 
nonabusive, non coercive manner. This would be true to traditional understanding 
of the fifth amendment from P89 until 1966: the idea that compulsion and 
coercion are unlawful but that voluntary statements and confessions are unob-
jectionable. This traditional concept has nothing to do with the litany and rituals 
of the Miranda system. 
The solicitude of those who support Mirandll for those individuals who are 
guilty of criminal activities and walk because the search for. truth has been 
thwarted in the police questioning process is impressive. One wonders if such 
solicitude would exist if their close friends or. family members were vi.ctims of 
crime. The fact is that every day of the week there are people in this country 
whose loved ones, relatives, and friends are subjected to crimimil predation by 
individuals who would not be walking the streets but for the impediments to the 
pursuit of truth in the criminal justice process that were created by the Miranda 
decision. 
IV. REBUTTAL OF MARCUS 
The criticism that. somehow Earl Warren magically pulled this new code of 
criminal procedure out of thin air in Miranda is wrong. The fact of the matter 
is that the Supreme Court has struggled for decades in trying to deal with 
confessions and the problems associated with confessions. For most of our legal 
history, and still a factor today, is the issue of whether or not a confession was 
voluntarily given. That works fine in the brutal cases involving beatings, whip-
pings, and threats. However, the voluntariness test does not work well in cases 
which are more subtle, where there are physical or verbal threats, where indivi-
duals are cut off, or where the suspect is not very bright. The use of the 
22. U.S. CoNST. art. V. 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds 
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified 
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: 
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in . the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of 
its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
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voluntariness test requires the Court to sit as a group of jurors to determine 
whether or not the individual knowingly, intelligently, and willingly gave up 
constitutional rights. 
Seemingly out of utter frustration after Escobedo,23 the Supreme Court in 
Miranda had had enough. In the future police officers would have to give 
warnings in order to get confessions admitted. Thus the question becomes, "Why 
the great concern?" If police officers simply gave the warnings, with little fuss 
and bother, the confessions would be admitted. If the objection to Miranda is 
not based solely on the amendment itself or its history, then the focus is on the 
warnings; Miranda somehow interferes with the "art" of interrogation. 
We have warnings in a lot of areas. It would be unthinkable that a suspect 
in a serious felony case would lose the right to counsel simply because he did 
not affirmatively ask for a lawyer; that is not a waiver. Under Gideon the 
individual has to be told of the right to have an attorney and then the suspect 
makes a free and willing decision whether to represent himself or have a lawyer. 24 
This decision does not seem to have bothered people very much. Yet under 
Miranda there appears to be an argument that by giving the warnings, the system 
works too well;· persons now really understand their rights and therefore may 
not respond to interrogation. As a matter of policy we must ask ourselves if the 
individual really understands his rights prior to confessing. This policy is fair, 
equitable, decent, and civilized. Little evidence exists that such a policy has 
crippled our criminal justice system. The empirical data of twenty years ago must 
be open to question. Moreover, within the last twenty years, times have changed 
individuals' understanding of their rights; law enforcement officers are better 
trained, better educated, and far more professional. Who is to say what the 
impact is of the warnings. Additionally, if the argument is that, by having 
Miranda, conviction rates are lower, this argument is just wrong. Conviction 
rates remain high across the country and the use of confessions has minimal 
impact except in a given number of cases. 
There are arguments that, even if Miranda is a good idea, it does not do 
its job very well, that there are better ways of making sure that people voluntarily 
give up their rights, and are advised of their rights. Such methods include 
involving magistrates in the process, having tape recordings, and having time 
limits of some sort. In this respect the critics may be right and I would encourage 
efforts in these areas. The Supreme Court in Miranda specifically said that the 
Miranda decision was no legal straightjacket and encouraged legislators to take 
efforts which would both protect individual rights and advise individuals of their 
constitutional rights. 2$ Yet the only major effort that has been done in this area 
was a blatant and heavy-handed attempt by Congress to legislatively overrule 
23. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
24. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Miranda. Such an effort hardly met the calling for innovative and interesting 
alternatives by state and federal legislation. 
Those who really know what Miranda meant twenty years ago and what it 
means today generally do not oppose Miranda. Law enforcement has become 
accommodated to Miranda and there appears to be no valid reason to turn back 
the clock. Justices who either dissented from Miranda or were known to be 
critical of Miranda when it was decided appear to have no yearning to overrule 
it today. Former Justice Burger wrote: "The meaning of Miranda has become 
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures: I 
would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date. " 26 
Justice White who actually dissented in Miranda has said that Miranda confirmed 
that a suspect has a right to remain silent and to be free of interrogation until 
he has consulted a laywer. Justice O'Connor is on record stating, "[W)ere the 
Court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its holding (narrowing 
Miranda). But Miranda is now the law and, in my view, the Court has not 
provided sufficient justification for departing from it or from blurring its now 
clear strictures," and Miranda "strikes the proper balance between society's 
legitimate law enforcement interest and the protection of the defendant's fifth 
amendment right. " 27 Warnings as to silence and counsel make good sense in the 
criminal justice setting. 28 
26. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980). 
27. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984). 
28. Editor's note: The United States Supreme Court, in a six to two decision announced June 
15, 1988 (Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case), extended the 
rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) to prohibit custodial interrogation regarding an 
unrelated investigation once a suspect has requested counsel, unless the accused initiates the 
communication. Arizona v. Roberson, __ U.S. __ , 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988). Justice Stevens, in 
the majority opinion, reiterated the benefits of the prophylactic Miranda warnings: to protect against 
the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation and to provide a bright-line rule easily applied by 
law enforcement officers and the courts. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice 
Kennedy, stated his opinion that the per se rule of Roberson was unnecessary. "Balance is essential 
when the Court fashions rules which are preventative and do not themselves stern from violations of 
a constitutional right." /d. at __ , 108 S.Ct. at 2098 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
